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DISCOVERY AND PRE-TRIAL EXAMINATION IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
HRmar R. BAZI*
This evening I am going to talk to you about DISCOVERY. This
is not the first time I have been concerned with discovery. In fact,
during the 30 years that I -have been engaged in legal activity I have
been constantly confronted with the discovery problem.
As a law student I feared the discovery of final examinations
lest my professors discover too little in my answers; as a trial lawyer
I feared my opponent might discover a weak point or points in my
case; during the war, as a government lawyer in the field, I was re-
peatedly unable to discover a sound basis for the regulations which
emanated from Washington and which I was supposed to adminis-
ter; and now as a law teacher I find that the bulk of my working
hours are spent in research ..... in short the discovery of law.
One of the consequences of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in so far as they relate to Discovery is that certain of those principles
which, early in our legal careers, we learned were sacrosanct -no
longer hold good. There are certain words or phrases that impress
the young law student and lawyer. He acquires a liking for them
and freely discourses on "res ipsa loquitur," "res gestae," "due pro-
cess," and so on. But the two things that impressed me most and
which I catalogued with the darkest of legal sins... were embodied
in the words "RANK HEARSAY" and "FISHING EXPEDI-
TION."
One of the definitions Webster gives for "rank" is "strong
scented, offensive in smell or taste." Incidentally, have you ever
noticed that if you object to something as hearsay you don't impress
the court quite as much as if you say, "Your Honor, I object, this
is rank hearsay?"
Well, whatever the offensive odor had to do with hearsay there
was one thing certain - if what you were trying to do prior to the
Federal Rules of 1938 smelled anything like a "fishing expedition"
you were in the judicial doghouse for sure.
Now prior to my study of law I had thought fishing expeditions
were something to be enjoyed, looked forward to and engaged in as
frequently as other events would permit. But I soon learned my
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. This is an address given by Professor
Baer at the Institute on Federal Practice of the South Carolina Bar Association, held in
Columbia, S. C., on January 22-23, 1954.
1
Baer: Discovery and Pre-Trial Examination in the Federal Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
DISCOVRY AND PR4-TRIAL EXAMINATION
error when, on motion of my adversary to strike out some interroga-
tories I had served, the judge looked at me as if I had been found
guilty of stealing a child's piggy bank, struck out my interrogatories
and said, "Why, you are simply on a fishing expedition and I won't
allow that in my court!"
But today, under the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules, even "rank hearsay" may be the subject of proper inquiry
in the pre-trial stages if it would appear "reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 1  And as to "fishing
expeditions" ... times have changed ... you are no longer a sinner
when you embark on one ... in fact you are invited to do so. You
have the blessing of the Supreme Court as appears from the words
of Justice Murphy speaking for that court in the renowned Hickman
v. Taylor case,2
No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition"
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts under-
lying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.
To that end either party may compel the other to disgorge what-
ever facts he has in his possession.
You will find the provisions on Discovery and Depositions in Chap-
ter V of the Federal Rules, specifically Rules 26 to 37 inclusive.
Prior to the adoption of these rules there was very little that could
be done by way of discovery in an action at law in a federal court
no matter what the state procedure might have been. Interroga-
tories were not permissible on the law side. Depositions were very
limited in scope. You are familiar with the old deposition de bene
esse.
By filing a bill of discovery on the Equity side in aid of your ac-
tion at law you could obtain some relief. The courts were in conflict
as to whether through such a bill you could only obtain discovery
as to your own case or defence or could get it on any issue in dis-
pute. But, neither at law, nor equity, could you use the deposition
procedure merely for discovery purposes.
Now let us examine into the changes effected by the Federal Rules.
In doing this we will consider both the rules themselves and cases
which have been decided on interesting problems in which the courts
have been called upon to construe the rules and frequently have taken
conflicting views.
1. Rule 26 b as amended 1946.
2. 329 U. S. 495 (1947).
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RULE 26. DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION.
Pursuant to this rule:
I. You may take the deposition of any one, a party or otherwise.
2. It may be upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
3. It may be taken to discover evidence or it may itself be used as
evidence.
4. No leave of court is necessary to take the deposition unless the
person to be examined is in prison or unless you as plaintiff wish
to serve notice of the taking of the depositions within less than
20 days after the commencement of the suit. It is the service of
the notice, and not the taking of the deposition to which the 20
day period refers. The defendant does not have to ask for leave
of court but may serve notice at any time of the taking of deposi-
tions. The reason for requiring the plaintiff to get leave was to
give defendant time to obtain counsel.
5. The examination may relate either to your own claim or defence
or that of- any other party.
45. You can inquire into the existence, custody, condition, location
and description of any books or documents or tangible things. In
addition you may ask the names and addresses of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts. You get the names of your oppo-
nent's witnesses and find out where they are.
7. You can inquire into any matter that is relevant to the subject
matter of the suit as long as it is not privileged .... and provided
the court has not by order restricted the scope of your inquiry
under Rule 30(b) and (d).
8. And finally, remember it is not ground for objection that the
testimony you seek to elicit is not admissible as evidence at the
trial .... you may get it "if the testimony sought appears reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Procedure re taking of depositions.
1. How much notice must you give?
Reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action
(Rule 30a).
2. Before whom can you take the deposition?
If in the United States or its possessions before any person
3. Rule 26 b.
(Vol. 6
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authorized by local or United States law to administer oaths, or
a person appointed by the court in which the action is pending,
or such person as the parties may stipulate upon.
If taken abroad before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul,
or consular agent of the United States or a person appointed by
commission or letters rogatory. (Rule 28).
3. What must the notice contain?
Name and address of each person to be examined and the time
and place of the examination.
4. Can you, as the party served, get the time extended or limit the
scope of the examination?
Under Rule 30(b) if you have been served with notice to take
depositions you can apply to the court and on good cause the
court may make orders as follows:
(a) that the deposition not be taken,
(b) that it be taken at some other place or time,
(c) that it be only on written interrogatories,
(d) that certain matters should not be examined into or that the
examination be confined to certain matters,
(e) that no one but the parties and counsel should be present,
(f) that secret processes, developments and research do not need
to be disclosed,
(g) that certain documents be ordered put in sealed envelopes to
be opened as directed by the court,
(h) that whatever is needed to protect a party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression be ordered.
5. Suppose that during the taking of the examination you feel it is
being unreasonably done what can you do?
Refuse to go on and forthwith apply to the court, show what
is being done that is unreasonable, etc. and the court can then
make such orders as it sees fit, stop the entire examination or
limit it, that is declare what may be done in the future. (Rule
30(d) ).
When and how do you use the deposition after it has been taken?
1. You may do nothing with it at all. You may have used it simply
for discovery, you have the evidence, you obtained the names and
addresses of witnesses, and you go on from there, or
2. You may, to the extent that it would be admissible in evidence,
offer it into evidence at the trial or motion or interlocutory pro-
ceeding, in accordance with the following rules:
19541
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1954], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol6/iss3/3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTE[LY
(a) You may use it to contradict or impeach the deponent when
he is on the stand as a witness,
(b) If the deponent was a party or an officer, director or manag-
ing agent of a corporation or association or partnership the
adverse party may use it for any purpose, that is to prove
facts or to impeach,
(c) You may use the deposition of a party or witness for any
purpose if the court finds:
1. The witness is dead,
2. He is further than 100 miles away or out of the United
States and the party using the deposition did not procure
his absence,
3. The witness can't attend because of age, illness or im-
prisonment,
4. He was subpoenaed and you couldn't get him to court,
5. That exceptional circumstances exist to make it desirable
in the interest of justice to allow the deposition to be-used.
3, You can introduce only a part of a deposition in evidence but, if
you do, your adversary can demand that all of it relevant to the
part introduced be put in.
4. You do not make a person your witness by taking his deposition.
If you do introduce any part of his deposition you make him your
witness unless you used it to impeach or contradict him or unless
the witness was your adversary or an officer, director, managing
agent of a corporation or association or partnership that is your
opponent.
5. You may rebut any relevant evidence contained in any deposition
no matter whether you or your opponent introduced it.
Objections
When depositions are taken orally any objections as to evidence
are noted by the officer before whom the deposition is taken and the
questions answered subject to the objection. You do not waive
any objection as to competency of witnesses or as to the evidence
if you do not make it at the time of taking the deposition unless
the ground urged is one that could have been overcome when the
testimony was being taken. When the deposition is offered into
evidence you make your objections as to the admissibility of evidence
even though you did not do so at the hearing except if you fall under
the rule just stated.
[Vol. 6
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RULE 31. DEPOSITIONS BY WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES.
Prepare your questions, serve them on all the other parties, and
in 10 days the other parties may serve cross interrogatories; then
you can serve re-direct in 5 days and then the other party or parties
can serve re-cross interrogatories within 3 days. Copies of all are
sent to the officer taking the deposition by the party who requested
the examination. He then proceeds to take the examination by ask-
ing the deponent to answer the various interrogatories.
RULES 33 AND 34. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
We should note that the provisions we have discussed relate to
depositions which may be taken of any person including a party.
They may be orally taken or by way of written interrogatories.
Now Rule 33 relates solely to the matter of interrogatories ad-
dressed to parties. Note the following:
1. Any party may serve on any adverse party written interrogatories.
If the party is a corporation, etc. the questions are to be answered
by an officer or agent. Individual party answers himself.
2. You may serve interrogatories without leave of court except if
you are plaintiff and you wish to serve them within 10 days of
the commencement of suit you must get leave.
3. The interrogatories must be answered in writing under oath with-
in 15 days after service and be signed by the answering party. The
court can enlarge the 15 day time limit.
4. If you don't like the interrogatories you can, within 10 days after
service, make written objections thereto, serve these and give no-
tice of a motion for a hearing of the objections.
5. You can inquire into anything under this rule by interrogatory that
you could under the deposition proceeding.
6. You can use the answers for evidence or impeachment.
7. You may take depositions and then interrogatories or vice versa.
You may serve as many sets of interrogatories and ask as many
questions as you wish but the court may make such protective
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Discovery and production of documents, etc. under Rule 34.
To obtain an inspection of documents, photos, tangible objects,
etc. in the possession or custody3a of a party you apply to the court
for an order that the party produce the desired paper, object, etc.
for inspection, copying or photographing. The matter sought must
not be privileged.
You must give notice of your motion and show "good cause" in
your application.
You may also apply for an order to inspect real estate, make sur-
veys, etc.
The scope as to what you can obtain production of is as broad as
the examination under Rule 26b, that means the document, etc. does
not have to be admissible in evidence itself. It is enough if it is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The order specifies the time, place and manner of making inspec-
tion and copying, etc.
Contrast Rule 34 with Rule 26 and Rule 45.
Under Rule 45 a subpoena may be issued commanding a person to
produce documents and tangible things mentioned therein.
Rule 26 as to depositions incorporates the subpoena duces tecum
powers of Rule 45.
So actually, it is clear that a party may be in a position where he
will have to produce documents, etc. when his deposition is taken
under Rule 26, or produce them prior to or during the trial by virtue
of an order under Rule 34,4 or produce them at the trial as a result
of having been served with a subpoena ducem tecum under Rule 45.
N oT. While you need an order to get production under Rule 34
a subpoena duces tecum issues as a matter of course- no order is
needed but the party served may raise objection and serve a notice
to quash the subpoena.
I think that we have at this time reached the point where it would
be well worth while to consider some of the decided cases interpret-
ing those rules which we have thus far considered.
3a. Actual possession of the document is not essential if the party is in a'
position to procure production of the original or a certified copy. Thus a party
may be required to obtain copies of tax returns that have been filed by him.
See Reeves v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 80 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1948).
4. See United States v. Smith, 117 F. 2d 911 (9th Cir. 1941) holding that
production could be ordered under Rule 34 at the trial and, contra, United
States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) holding that a
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It appears that no matter how thoroughly rules are drawn, how
carefully they are phrased, cases will arise in which a question of
interpretation and construction comes up. It is then that the courts
are called upon to act and frequently they do not respond in the
same way.
HICKMAN V. TAYLOR AND ITS AFTERMATH.
No case in the field of Discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has caused the spilling of more ink, is of greater signifi-
cance to the practising attorney, or has been more frequently cited
than Hicknan v. Taylor.5 While most of us here are more or less
familiar with the Hickman case, we cannot adequately appraise the
decisions following it without a reexamination of the facts and de-
cision in that case.
A tugboat had capsized in the Delaware river. Five of the nine
seamen on board were drowned. The action in question was brought
by the widow of one of the deceased seamen to recover for his death
under the Jones Act. A public hearing was had before the United
States Steamboat Inspectors at which the four survivors testified.
Their testimony was recorded and made available to all parties.
Shortly thereafter, Samuel Fortenbaugh, attorney for Taylor and
Anderson who were the owners of the tugboat, privately interviewed
the survivors and took their signed statements. Fortenbaugh also
interviewed other persons and made some memoranda of what was
told to him orally.
After the institution of the suit the plaintiff served 39 interroga-
tories directed to the tug owners but it is only with the 38th that we
are concerned. That read:
State whether any statements of the members of the crews of
the Tugs J. M. Taylor and Philadelphia or of any other vessel
were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and
the sinking of the tug John M. Taylor. Attach hereto exact
copies of all such statements if in writing and if oral set forth
in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or re-
ports.
The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, their attorney, answered
all the interrogatories except this 38th claiming that it called for
matter that was privileged and was an attempt to obtain indirectly
counsel's private files.
5. 329 U. S. 495 (1947), affirming, 153 F. 2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945) which had
reversed 4 F.R.D. 479 (XD. Pa. 1945).
1954]
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At this point we might note that Rule 26b which provides for the
taking of depositions of any person, including a party, states that the
deponent "may be examined regarding any matter not privileged
which is relevant to the subject matter .... " and that Rule 33 pro-
vides for the service of interrogatories on any adverse party and states
that such interrogatories "may relate to any matters which can be
inquired into under Rule 26b." Further Rule 34 provides that one
party may notice an adverse party to produce for inspection and
copying papers or documents that are not privileged.
There was some confusion on the part of counsel and the lower
courts as to what rule or rules were applicable in this case. The
District Court concluded that Rules 33 and 34 were applicable while
the Circuit Court of Appeals stated Rule 26 was the applicable rule.
The Supreme Court held that it was clear the plaintiff was pro-
ceeding under Rule 33 because she addressed interrogatories and was
not proceeding by way of deposition. Since Rule 34 applies only to
parties it could not be used to compel the attorney to produce the
papers in question. Rule 33 is also limited to parties. Therefore
the only proper procedure available to the plaintiff was to take Fort-
enbaugh's deposition under Rule 26 and serve him with a subpoena
duces tecum to produce the statements involved. The Supreme Court
brushed aside the procedural improprieties and turned to the basic
question as to whether or not the attorney would be obliged to pro-
duce the statements sought.
When the problem was presented to the District Court that court
sat in banc. It held that the requested matters were not privileged
and ordered the tug owners and their counsel Fortenbaugh to
. . . produce all written statements obtained by Fortenbaugh
as counsel and agent for defendants, (and to) state in substance
any fact concerning this case which defendants learned through
oral statements made by witnesses to Mr. Fortenbaugh whether
or not included in his private memoranda ....
The tug owners and Fortenbaugh refused, the court adjudged the
defendants and their counsel in contempt and ordered them im-
prisoned until they complied. They never complied.
It so happens that Sam Fortenbaugh was a classmate of mine in
law school and in the course of teaching the Hickman case to my stu-
dents I wrote Sam a letter and asked him what actually happened as
to his conviction- had he ever spent any time in jail pending the
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals? I received an interesting
[Vol. 6
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letter from him and I'll read you an excerpt or two from it. He
writes,
I am aware that law school case books dwell on the case and I
am an object of some curiosity .... The opinion is correct
in stating that a court order was entered impounding me until
I purged myself of such contempt. As a matter of fact, with-
out such an order, there could have been no appeal at this stage
of the proceeding. The fact remains that I was not even finger
printed and the appeal with supersedeas was flied forthwith. I
had no opportunity to be a martyr and have my picture taken
between the bars. Maybe I missed an opportunity to go dra-
matic.
As a homely sideline on the case, Captain Taylor insists that
we were victorious in the Supreme Court of the United States
because he fell asleep in that august chamber and thus con-
vinced the judges that he was not worried about any imprison-
ment.
And then Sam adds a final paragraph to his letter which is so
typical of the reactions of trial attorneys. He concludes,
Upon the trial of the cause, I offered in evidence the very
statements which I had sought to preserve in the discovery pro-
ceedings. Counsel for the plaintiff objected to their admission
and the court sustained him. As you can divine, there was
nothing harmful in the statements and our battling on the dis-
covery point was entirely one of principle.
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court.
It also sat in banc. It held that the matters sought were "privileged
as the work product of the lawyer."
The plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
That court first refused the petition. A petition for a reargument
was filed and both the CIO and AF of L joined as amici curiae and
the certiorari was then granted.
While the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals in that it reversed the contempt conviction and held that
the interrogatory in question need not be answered it did so on quite
different grounds. Briefly the Supreme Court held:
1. The federal discovery rules are to be given a "broad and liberal
treatment". No longer can one raise the time honored cry of
"fishing expedition". "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."
19541
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2. The statements in question did not fall under the attorney and
client privilege. They are not protected by any privilege. They
were not made in confidence by a client to his attorney. There
is no privilege as to information given an attorney by a witness
nor as to writings prepared by counsel for his own use or writ-
ings which reflect his mental impressions.
3. But before the court will order the production of documents
from an attorney's files of the type here demanded the party
seeking discovery must show necessity and justification for such
discovery.
4. No such necessity and justification was shown in this case, in
fact it appeared that the identity of the witnesses in question
was known and their testimony was already on file and open
to inspection in the office of the United States Steamboat In-
spectors.
5. To allow the discovery of the type sought here in the absence of
showing necessity would contravene public policy.
The Supreme Court made it clear that it was not placing a pro-
tective shield on all written materials obtained or prepared by counsel,
in fact in a proper case such discovery might be ordered as where
the witnesses were no longer available, but before intrusion into the
privacy of an attorney's files would be ordered the applicant must
satisfy the court that such intrusion is 'necessary and justifiable. The
court said,
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify un-
warranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of
an attorney.
As to the oral statements made to counsel and the memoranda the
attorney made from them the court stated it did not believe that any
necessity could be shown under the circumstances of this case to justi-
fy such production.
If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these
matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.
In fact, the court said that if attorneys were to be forced to testify
as to what they remember a witness told them or what they saw fit
to write down after talking to a witness, "The standards of the pro-
fession would thereby suffer".
[Vol. 6
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DECISIONS FOLLOWING THE HICKMAN CASE.
We should not fail to note that the decision in the Hicknan case
related solely to discovery of statements obtained by an attorney from
witnesses with an eye to litigation. The court did not decide whether
the same showing of necessity and justification would be required
if the plaintiff had been trying to obtain discovery of statements ob-
tained by the defendants themselves or by their claim agents. The
status of the lawyer and his function in the judicial process was em-
phasized throughout the court's opinion.
It was inevitable that litigation would develop which would call
upon the courts to determine whether the rule of the Hickman case
requiring a showing of necessity or justification for discovery
would apply when the documents sought were not obtained by and
in the attorney's files but were obtained and held by the defendant
or its other agents. We will consider cases where that question was
raised.
APPLICABILITY OF HICKMAN RULE TO
DOCUMENTS OBTAINED BY PERSONS OTHER
THAN ATTORNEYS.
The question was presented in Alltmont v. United States.6 The
action was in admiralty against the United States, the libellants seek-
ing to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to be due to
the negligence of the defendant, etc. Proceeding under Admiralty
Rules corresponding to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the libellant
served interrogatories on the United States and sought the names
and addresses of witnesses and demanded that copies of statements
obtained from witnesses be attached, including statements taken by
the F.B.I. The district court ordered the United States to furnish
copies of the statements but the United States refused, contending
that the statements were privileged within the rule of Hickman v.
Taylor, that is that the libellant could not get them as a matter of
right but had to show necessity. The United States did, in answer
to the interrogatories, furnish the names and addresses of the wit-
nesses. It happened that the statements were taken by F.B.I. per-
sonnel who were also lawyers. The Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court and ruled that libellant would have to show necessity
before the United States would be obliged to furnish copies of the
statements.
Specifically the Court of Appeals ruled that it is immaterial that in
6. 177 F. 2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 967 (1950).
1954]
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one case counsel representing the defendant does the investigation
himself and in another case does it by others employed by him, or
his client.
In either situation the rationale of the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the Hickman case requires that the same showing of
good cause for the production of such statements of witnesses
should be made by the adverse party seeking copies of them.
7
The Court of Appeals recognized that the Hickman rule of neces-
sity was declared in a case involving statements obtained by counsel
but it specifically gave the decision broader sweep to cover statements
obtained by the party. Thus it said,
While the language of the Supreme Court was (in the Hickman
case) necessarily directed to statements obtained personally by
Fortenbaugh as counsel for the adverse party since only such
statements were involved in the Hickman case, we think that
its rationale has a much broader sweep and applies to all state-
ments of prospective witnesses which a party has obtained for
his trial counsel's use.8
If the theory of the Court of Appeals in the Alltntont case is sound
then a party could not obtain discovery of statements obtained by
claim agents of his adverse party without showing necessity.
In Hoffman v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.9 District Judge Wilkin
in Ohio had taken the same position as the Court of Appeals in the
Alitmont case and said,
The plaintiff is not entitled to statements made to defendant
by witnesses in the absence of a showing why such information
cannot be secured from the witnesses by deposition.
While some district court judges have declared that the Hickman
case does not give to statements obtained by claim agents the same
kind of immunity that pertains to statements obtained by counsel they
have, when granting discovery, found that "good cause" for discovery
was shown by the applicant. 10
7. 177 F. 2d 971 at 976.
8. Ibid.
9. 7 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Ohio 1947).
10. See Thomas v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 7 F.R.D. 610 (E.D. N. Y.
1947), and Royal Exchange Assurance v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D. N.Y.
1952). See also Lauritzen v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 8 F.R.D. 237 (E.D.
Tenn. 1948), aff'd, 182 F. 2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950) where, upon a showing of
necessity, defendant was obliged to produce for inspection photographs, names
and addresses of witnesses on its bus and statements obtained by defendant
from its passengers and other witnesses.
[Vol. 6
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It is sometimes difficult to understand how a court reaches a given
result in this discovery process. Take for example Dulansky v. Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Electric Co." There in an action for wrongful death
plaintiff acting under Rule 34 made two requests for production and
inspection of documents, (1) the written report made by the driver
of the defendant's bus that killed the child and (2) "all reports and
written memoranda made by any officer, claim agent or other agent
in the full time employ of this defendant or other employees pertain-
ing to the accident . .. including statements made by any .. .eye
witnesses to the accident." The court found good cause to require
the production of the bus driver's statement but found there was no
good cause shown to compel the production of the other matters sought
in item (2).
WHAT CONSTITUTES "NECESSITY" OR "GOOD CAUSE"
SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE PRODUCTION OF STATE-
MENTS OBTAINED FROM WITNESSES?
We have seen that under the Hickman case discovery of statements
of witnesses obtained by counsel would not be ordered in the absence
of showing a necessity. We saw that the Court of Appeals in the
Alltmont case held that the same showing of good cause applied to
all statements obtained by defendant from witnesses whether through
his counsel or not. In addition, Rule 34 relating to the production for
inspection of instruments, and applicable only to the parties in the
cause, expressly states that "Upon motion of any party showing good
cause" the court may order the production for inspection and copying
any non-privileged document... etc.
It will be worth while, then, to consider what the courts have found
constitutes or fails to constitute "good cause."
In the Hickman case the Supreme Court stated that "Production
night be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can
be reached only with difficulty."
But assuming that the witness is available would "good cause"
be established by showing that immediately after the accident the
defendant obtained a statement from the witness and that now con-
siderable time has elapsed from the taking of that statement and that
plaintiff was not in a position to get an early statement as did the
defendant? The courts have not agreed on this point.
In De Bruce v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. 12 judge irkpatrick of the
11. 10 F.R.D. 146 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
12. 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Judge Kirkpatrick, incidentally, is the
same district judge who ordered the production of the statements by attorney
Fortenbaugh in the Hickman case.
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania said that a copy of a statement
procured from a witness could be obtained by interrogatory with-
out showing good cause but said that if "good cause" was required
it was established when the plaintiff showed that the accident oc-
curred over a year ago, that the defendant through its claim depart-
ment immediately interviewed witnesses and obtained their statements,
and that the plaintiff was not in a position to do so until after a
considerable lapse of time. Judge Kirkpatrick's theory was that
the statement of the witness taken immediately after the accident
was of "unique value in the development of the truth" and that every
consideration of fairness requires that it be made available to both
sides.
The same view was taken by the court in Thomas v. Pennsylvania
RR. Co.13 where the defendant was required to produce witnesses'
statements taken soon after the accident notwithstanding the fact
that plaintiff's counsel had after the commencement of the action
taken the depositions of the same witnesses. The court was of the
opinion that plaintiff's counsel should be able to determine if the
story told on the depositions was the same as told to defendant's claim
agent after the accident.
Other cases take the position that if the witnesses are available
for examination no good cause exists for demanding the production
of statements taken by the adversary.
14
In Hanke v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Transport Co.15 the court
ordered the defendant's claim agent to give plaintiff a list of the
names and addresses of witnesses known to him. Plaintiff could
then interview the witnesses and, if the witness failed to give a
statement to the plaintiff, the court stated he would then order the
defendant to produce any signed statement it had of such witness.
In Reynolds v. United States'6 three civilian employees of private
organizations were killed when an Air Force B29 bomber in which
they were travelling as observers crashed. The flight was for the
purpose of testing electronic equipment. Suit was brought against
the United States by their widows under the Federal Torts Claims
Act and damages sought for wrongful death. The plaintiffs pro-
ceeded both by interrogatories under Rule 33 and sought production
under Rule 34 of the official investigation report prepared by officers
13. Supra note 10.
14. See to that effect Reeves v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 8 F.R.D. 616
D. Del. 1949) and Bennett v. New York Central Railroad Co., 9 F.R.D. 17
W.D. N. Y. 1949).
15. 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
16. 192 F. 2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U. S. 1 (1953).
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of the Air Force and the statements taken by the government from
surviving crew members. To show "good cause," the plaintiffs made
affidavits that the documents sought contained evidence necessary
to prepare for trial, that the documents were in the possession of
the United States, and that plaintiffs knew no way to obtain knowl-
edge of their contents, or the cause of the accident, other than by
production.
The District Court ordered production and disallowed a claim of
privilege set up by the United States. Thereafter a formal claim
of privilege was made to the District Judge by the Secretary of
the Air Force, and in addition, the Judge Advocate General of the
Air Force supplied the names and addresses of the survivors and
offered to make them available to examination by the plaintiffs.
The District Judge then amended his previous order and directed
that the documents sought be produced before him for examination
so that he could determine whether disclosure would violate the
government's privilege against disclosing matters involving the na-
tional or public interest. The United States failed to comply with
this order and the District Judge then acting under Rule 37 issued
an order that the issue of negligence be taken as established in the
plaintiff's favor and prohibited a defence by the government. Later
a hearing on damages was held and judgment entered for the plain-
tiffs.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the District Judge.
It agreed that the judge was correct in finding "good cause." It
also agreed that the mere furnishing the names and addresses of the
surviving witnesses and making them available for examination was
not, under the circumstances, a sufficient answer to plaintiff's demand.
It placed emphasis on the value of statements taken immediately
following the catastrophe.
The Court of Appeals also held that, at least in cases falling under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the government, through the Secretary
of the Air Force, could not by claim of privilege deprive the District
Court of judicial review of that claim. The procedure for examina-
tion in chambers by the trial judge was held a proper method by
which the court could determine whether or not the government
should be forced to make discovery. Having refused to submit to
judicial review as to the claim of privilege, the government was held
to suffer the same consequences a private individual would suffer
under Rule 37.
The Supreme Court allowed certiorari and by a vote of 6 to 3
reversed the Court of Appeals. Chief Justice Vinson wrote the
1954]
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majority opinion while Justices Frankfurter, Black and Jackson
agreed with the views expressed by judge Mars for the Court of
Appeals.
The majority decision is interesting in that it does not give ab-
solute power to either the executive or judicial branch of the govern-
ment relative to the disclosure of the documents in question. The
Chief Justice compared the situation here with that in which the
privilege against self incrimination is invoked. In such a case the
bare assertion of the privilege by the witness is not to be taken as
conclusive. Neither is the court to make such extended inquiry into
the basis of the claim so as to compel a disclosure of the thing the
privilege is meant to protect.
There is a sound basis of compromise. The court must be satis-
fied from all the evidence and circumstances in the setting in which
the question is asked that a responsive answer to the question, or.
an explanation of why it cannot be answered, might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure would result.
Applying this rule of compromise to the case before us, the Su-
preme Court laid down the following rules:
(1) Mere refusal to make discovery by counsel for the govern-
ment on the ground of privilege is not enough . . . there
must be "a formal claim of privilege lodged by the head of
the department which has control over the matter after actual
personal consideration by that officer."'
7
(2) The court itself "must determine whether the circumstances
are appropriate for the claim of privilege and yet do so with-
out forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is de-
signed to protect."'s
(3) "Privileged" as used in Rule 34 refers to privileges as that term
is understood in the law of evidence and that law has es-
tablished and recognizes a privilege against revealing military
secrets.
(4) Under the circumstances of this case, in view of the fact that
it appeared the plane had gone aloft to test secret electronic
equipment, there was a reasonable danger that production of
the accident investigation report would disclose military se-
crets. Consequently the claim of privilege was appropriate
and should be honored. The judge cannot compel disclosure
even to himself in private under these circumstances.
17. 345 U. S. 1 at 7.
18. 345 U. S. I at 8.
[Vol. 6
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The majority concluded that there were here no circumstances
showing great necessity for disclosure of the investigation reports.
When the surviving witnesses were made available to the plaintiffs,
sufficient disclosure was made. However, even the most compelling
necessity, on the part of the plaintiffs, to obtain discovery "cannot
overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
that military secrets are at stake."'1
In connection with this problem of governmental privilege I would
like to refer to Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States,
2 0
a case from the District Court in the Northern District of Florida.
Here there was a libel against the United States following a collision
with a vessel in charge of Navy personnel. Libellant sought the
production of all statements obtained by the government through its
investigation. The Secretary of the Navy filed a claim of privilege.
District Judge De Vane said there was no question of the right of
the Secretary of the Navy to decline to produce records where the
public interest requires such refusal, but he said that it appeared
to him, during the course of the argument, that the documents sought
by the libellant had already been furnished to the proctor represent-
ing the government.
"If this is true," he continued, "these documents have lost their
privileged and confidential status."
This conclusion struck me as very interesting. If in the Reynolds
case it had appeared that the Secretary of the Air Force had shown.
the accident investigation report to the government's counsel would
Chief Justice Vinson have declared the privileged status of the re-
port lost ?
CAN PLAINTIFF COMPEL PRODUCTION OF HIS OWN
STATEMENT TAKEN BY DEFENDANT?
Those of you who are negligence lawyers are familiar with the
situation that frequently embarrasses the plaintiff's attorney. An in-
vestigator for the insurance company of the defendant got to the
plaintiff before the plaintiff obtained an attorney. The investigator
took a signed statement from the plaintiff which presumably gave
the plaintiff's version of the accident. That statement in due course
found its way into the files of defendant's counsel, and, when plain-
tiff's counsel tried to settle the case, he was chided with the state-
ment by defence counsel that, "We have a signed statement from
19. 345 U. S. 1 at 11.
20. 103 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Fla. 1952).
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your man and as far as we are concerned he has talked himself right
out of court."
Can plaintiff now obtain discovery of his own statement which is
in the files of the defendant?
The cases are in conflict. Is it possible for the plaintiff to show
"good cause" for the production of his own statement?
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds21 the plaintiff had slipped on
the floor of defendant's store. Two weeks after the accident he
gave a signed statement to an attorney for the insurer of the de-
fendant. He now sought its production under Rule 34. Plaintiff's
counsel in applying for production said,
We need it to know what our man said at that time shortly
after the accident ..... .This statement is needed to help us
prepare for trial, to give us some advance warning of any ma-
terial change in his statement made to defendant's investigator
different than what he gave us as to the claim.
The District Court ordered production but the Court of Appeals
reversed finding no showing of "good cause" and no prejudice to
plaintiff if statement not produced.
The opposite point of view was reached in Hayman v. Pullman
22
where plaintiff sought damages for physical and mental distress she
suffered at the hands of one of defendant's porters. She proceeded
by way of interrogatories under Rule 33 and asked the names and
addresses of passengers who had filed written complaints about the
action of the porter she described in her complaint and concluded
the interrogatory with the sentence,-
Attach to your answer a copy of each of these protests or com-
plaints including those written by the plaintiff ....
The district Judge ordered the interrogatory answered and the
copy of the statements given including that of the plaintiff. As to
the plaintiff's own statement the court said,
The complaint made by the plaintiff at the time her alleged
cause of action arose even though it may be self serving if in
the possession of the defendant should be produced. The only
reason that may be assigned for refusing to do it is to make the
element of surprise available to the defendant .... No possible
right of the defendant may be prejudiced by disclosing all the
evidence it possesses pertaining to the instant action.
21. 176 F. 2d 476 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
22. 8 F.R.D. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
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NoTu. What about the procedure? Can you get copies of state-
ments under Rule 33 or must you proceed under Rule 34?
There is a conflict in the cases here too, but in the Hayman v.
Pullman case just discussed the court ruled that it would only re-
sult in useless delay if after the plaintiff had been informed the
defendant had statements of witnesses by answers to interrogatories
under Rule 33 he would have to demand production under Rule 34.
On the other hand in Alltmont v. United States,23 which we dis-
cussed earlier, the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit held that
Rule 33 could not be used to get a copy of a document but that upon
learning of the existence of the document by interrogatories or other-
wise production can then be had under Rule 34 on showing good
cause.
In Raudenbush v. Reading Co.24 plaintiff proceeded under Rule 34
and sought production of a written statement he had given to de-
fendant's claim agent one month after the happening of the accident
and when the plaintiff was still confined to the hospital because of
injuries sustained in the accident. Plaintiff assigned as reasons for
getting a copy of the statement his inability to remember what he told
representatives of the defendant at the time.
In denying discovery the District Judge said,
It appears that plaintiff is concerned that his testimony . . .
to be given may be at variance with statements made to the
claims agent .... He made both statements .... If there is
any discrepancy between his testimony . . . and his previous
statements of course these documents might conceivably be used
for the purposes of cross examination and discrediting his testi-
mony . . . . That standing alone does not impress us as good
cause.
The judge concluded there was nothing shown to indicate fraud or
overreaching and accordingly in reliance on Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Reynolds25 denied discovery.
COMPELLING DISCLOSURE OF OPINION OF
ADVERSARY'S EXPERT.
It occasionally happens that one side or the other in a personal in-
jury case wishes to learn what opinion the expert employed by his
adversary has given. Thus, it may be that defendant would like to
23. Supra note 6.
24. 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
25. Supra note 21.
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see the opinion given to plaintiff by the medical expert employed
by the plaintiff.
The problem presents two aspects:
(1) In the given case is the opinion "privileged" either by virtue
of statute or case law, and
(2) Does your adversary have the right to get the opinion you
paid the expert for if it appears there is no privilege of
physician and patient involved?
An applicable decision is Holbert v. Chase26 which came up in the
eastern district of South Carolina.
It was a personal injury case arising out of an auto accident. Di-
versity of citizenship was the basis of federal jurisdiction. The
-plaintiff had been attended by Dr. Hoshall, of Charleston. The
defendant wished to take the deposition of Dr. Hoshall under Rule 26.
Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Hoshall's examinations and opinions as to
the plaintiff's physical condition were privileged and that defendants
are not entitled to the information sought. The Doctor objected on
the ground that the examination would result in him giving opinions
to parties who had not paid for them. Plaintiff's attorneys appeared
both for the plaintiff and the Doctor. Chief Judge Waring held:
(1) That although at common law there was no physician and
patient privilege and although there appears to be no statute
in South Carolina setting up such a privilege he found one
case (Cole v. Anderson Mills, 191 S. C. 458) which held
that there is a physician and patient privilege ... at least so
declared by dictum in any event. Accordingly, he found good
ground to claim privilege.
(2) Secondly, Judge Waring said privilege was not the deciding
factor. The rules do not, as Judge Waring sees it, require
a physician employed by one party to give his opinions, or
the results of his examination to the other party, if the other
party is free to obtain a physical examination through his
own physician.
The court thereupon denied the defendant the right to take Dr.
Hoshall's deposition.
In contrast with this last case consider Sachs v. Aluminum Co.
27
where in a patent suit the Aluminum Co. of America proceeded to
26. 12 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. S. C. 1952).
27. 167 F. 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
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take the deposition of one Dr. Sachs, an expert in x-ray metallog-
raphy who was engaged by Cold Metal Process Co., the adverse
party, to make certain tests of metal furnished him. Dr. Sachs'
services had been procured by Cold Metal Process Co. in prepara-
tion of the patent case.
The court held, per curiam, that there was no privilege and that
the District Judge, in light of Hickman v. Taylor, was correct in
directing that the Doctor answer questions put to him by counsel
for Aluminum Co. of America.
Query as to whether it is not unjust to require your expert to
disclose the opinion, for which you paid, to your adversary who pays
nothing! The courts in both Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport2 s
and Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.A9 were strongly of the
opinion that to compel such disclosure was not only not required un-
der the rules, but "would be equivalent to taking another's property
without making compensation therefor"8 0
RULE 35. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION
OF PERSONS.
A consideration of the question of whether or not your adversary
can obtain discovery of the opinion of your expert naturally leads
to a consideration of Rule 35 dealing with physical and mental ex-
amination of persons.
Largely, because there is usually no opposition on the part of
plaintiff's counsel, defense attorneys assume, as a matter of course,
that they are entitled to have the personal injury plaintiff examined.
In some states statutes expressly provide for such examination; in
others there are no statutes but the courts by decision have recognized
that right.
What had been the rule in the federal courts prior to the Federal
Rules of 1938?
I recall my introduction to the federal law very vividly. As a
young defence counsel I had, under our state procedure, repeatedly
demanded and obtained, without question on the part of plaintiff's
attorney, a physical examination of the plaintiff. On one occasion
I had before me a summons and complaint in a federal personal in-
jury suit. I phoned plaintiff's attorney and sought to make the usual
arrangement for a physical examination. He challenged my right to
have one, referred to what he called the Botsford case, but after some
28. 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
29. 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).
30. The quotation is from the Lewis case, supra note 28.
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more talk as to a possible settlement agreed to let my doctor examine
his client.
My interest was aroused; I looked up the Botsford case; it is
Union Pacific v. Botsford3l and I am sure that many of you are
familiar with its holding. Briefly, in that case, a majority of the
court (7 to 2) held that the defendant was not entitled to, and the
court had no power to order, a physical examination of plaintiff who
sought damages because of personal injuries. A judgment of $10,-
000 for the plaintiff, whom defendant had not been able to have
physically examined, was upheld. Some of you may remember the
interesting language of Mr. Justice Gray, spealing for the majority,-
To compel any one, especially a woman, to lay bare the body or
to submit it to the touch of a stranger without lawful authority
is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass, and no order for pro-
cess commanding such an exposure or submission was ever
known to the common law in the administration of justice be-
tween individuals, except in a very small number of cases based
upon special reasons and upon ancient practice coming down
from ruder ages, and now mostly obsolete in England and never
so far as we are aware introduced into this country.82
Ten years later in Camden & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson3s the
question was again before the Supreme Court. It appeared the case
arose in a federal court located in New Jersey and that New Jersey
had a statute which provided that in a personal injury action the
court could order the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination.
The majority of the Supreme Court (8 to 1) held that notwith-
standing the Botsford decision, when it appeared that a state statute
authorized such examination, the federal court could order the ex-
amination by virtue of the Rules of Decision Act.
And so, up until 1938 when the Federal Rules became effective,
you could not obtain, without consent, a physical examination of a
personal injury plaintiff in a federal court unless a state law gave you
such right of examination. Today the appropriate procedure is found
in Rule 35. Let's look at its provisions:
1. There is no absolute right to a physical or mental examination
... it is in the court's discretion.
2. It may be ordered whenever the mental or physical condition
of a party is in controversy.
31. 141 U. S. 250 (1890).
32. Ibid at 252. The italics are added.
33. 177 U. S. 172 (1900).
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3. The order for examination is only made on motion upon a show-
ing of "good cause."
4. The order specifies the scope, time, place and the person to
make the examination.
Before considering paragraph (b) of the rule let us inquire a bit
as to the construction to be placed on paragraph (a) outlined above.
It is to be noted that the examination may be ordered where the
mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy. Clearly
that would cover all suits for personal injuries.
But suppose the paternity of a child is in question? Can an ac-
cused father ask for blood grouping tests of the mother and child?
That problem arose in Beach v. Beach3 4 and was answered by the
majority in the affirmative. "Condition" of a party was held to in-
clude the characteristics of his blood.
It is interesting to note that Associate Justice Stephens dissented
on the ground that the Botsford case made Rule 35 invalid.
Suppose that plaintiff brings a libel action and alleges defendant
charges him with mental and physical peculiarities which plaintiff
denies he possesses. May the defendant obtain a physical and mental
examination of the plaintiff to support his plea of truth?
This question arose in Wadlow v. Humberd.35 The court denied
the examination on the ground that historically such examination was
limited to personal injury actions. Further it stated the mental or
physical condition was not directly in controversy. The case seems
to be out of line with the liberal purposes of the Federal Rules.
Suppose the plaintiff refuses to submit to a physical or mental
examination despite the court order?
Rule 37 sets up the consequences for failure to comply with an
order to submit to a physical or mental examination. Specifically
on such refusal an order may be entered that would either:
(a) strike out the plaintiff's pleadings,
(b) dismiss his action,
(c) prohibit him from introducing evidence as to his physical or
mental condition,
(d) deem the facts as to his condition as established in accordance
with the contentions of the defendant.
Now you will note, that under these penalty provisions, the plain-
tiff for all practical purposes has the doors of the federal court closed
to him if he fails to accede to the physical or mental examination.
34. 114 F. 2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
35. 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
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The statute which authorized the Supreme Court to adopt Civil
Rules of Procedure for the Federal Court specifically said that, "Said
rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights
of any litigant."3 8
If, prior to the federal rules, a plaintiff in a personal injury case
could obtain relief in a federal court without submitting to a physical
examination, is he today deprived of a substantive right when the
court dismisses his case because he refuses to submit to a physical
examination? If he is, then Rule 35 is invalid.
The question was answered in favor of the validity of the rule
by a very narrow margin in the 5 to 4 decision of Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co.37
Justice Roberts for the majority declared that the rule was pro-
cedural. It does not, he said, effect substantive rights. Further the
rules had lain in the lap of Congress and their failure to object to
Rule 35 indicates they deemed it within the ambit of the legislation
authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt rules of civil procedure.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the dissent, did not characterize
the rule as either procedural or substantive. Rather he thought the
problem was controlled by the policy declared in the Botsford case.
While, he said, legislation could change the Botsford rule, the in-
violability of the person should not be curtailed unless the authority
of law be dear.
He found in Rule 35 a "drastic change in public policy in a matter
deeply touching the sensibilities of people, or even their prejudices
as to privacy," and concluded that such a drastic change should only
be effected by legislation and not by rules designed to effectively
dispatch the business of the civil side of the federal courts.
Rule 35 (b) Mutual disclosure provisions.
There are very interesting discovery provisions as to the contents
of physicians reports of examinations contained in Ride 35 (b). It
provides in effect that:
1. The plaintiff who has been examined at the request of defendant
may ask for a copy of the defendant doctor's report on his ex-
amination.
2. If the plaintiff does so ask and receives the copy of the report
of defendant's doctor, then the defendant is entitled to receive
36. 28 U. S. C. Sec. 723.
37. 312 U. S. 1 (1941).
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from the plaintiff a like report of any examination made for
the same mental condition before or after such delivery.
3. Further if the plaintiff should take the deposition of the doctor
examining for the defendant or request a copy of the report
made by defendant's examining doctor the plaintiff waives any
privilege he might have as to the testimony of any one who
has or thereafter examines him as to his physical or mental
condition.
You will notice that the language of the rule, in so far as it re-
quires the plaintiff examined to produce copies of examination re-
ports, is very broad and says, "a like report of any examination,
previously or thereafter made of the same mental or physical con-
dition."
Does this mean that a plaintiff must furnish defendant with copies
of all hospital records pertaining to examination, etc.? No, accord-
ing to Butts v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,38 where Judge Holtzoff said
it is
.. . limited to medical examinations conducted at the request
of the party, and the reports, copies of which are subject to
production, are the reports made by the physician as the result
of such examination.
RULE 27. DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR
PENDING APPEAL.
Perpetuation of Testimony.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules an expectant litigant
could file a bill on the Equity side of the court to perpetuate testi-
mony. It was deemed an original bill and subject to all requirements
of service of process, venue, etc.
Rule 27 provides a simple method for perpetuating testimony. It
does not, however, abolish the power of the court to entertain the
old style bill to perpetuate testimony.
Procedure under Rule 27:
1. The person desiring to perpetuate his own or any one else's
testimony may file a verified petition in the United States Dis-
trict Court that is located in the district of any expected party.
2. The contemplated action must be one that could properly be
brought in a United States District Court. Where appropri-
38. 9 F.R.D. 58 (D. D.C. 1949).
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ate, diversity and jurisdictional amount must be present in the
contemplated action.
3. The petition is entitled in the name of the petitioner and must
show:
(a) that petitioner expects to be a party in such action and is
presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought,
(b) the subject matter of the action and petitioner's interest
in short, what is the contemplated action to be about,
(c) the facts he desires to perpetuate and why,
(d) the names and addresses of the anticipated adverse parties,
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined,
(f) the substance of the testimony he expects to elicit, and
(g) a prayer for relief, namely that an order issue authorizing
him to take the depositions of the persons he desires to
examine as set out in the petition.3 9
Notice and Service of Petition.
After the petition has been filed the petitioner must have service
made on every person named as an adverse party of a copy of the
petition and a notice stating the time and place the petitioner will
apply for the order. He must give at least 20 days notice.
Service is to be made of the notice and copy of the petition as
provided in cases for the service of a summons . . . namely by the
United States marshall under Rule 4.
It the marshall cannot make such service the court may order
service by publication and shall appoint an attorney for an adverse
party who was not personally served as provided under Rule 4 (d).
The attorney so appointed cross examines the party testifying.
On the return day of the notice of motion the court makes the
order sought if satisfied that perpetuation of the testimony may
prevent a failure or delay of justice.
Te order
The order designates or describes the person whose testimony is
to be taken; specifies the subject matter of the examination and states
whether oral deposition or written interrogatories are to be used.
The court may make orders for production of documents, physical
examinations, etc. as is provided for under Rules 34 and 35.
39. See Mosseller v. United States, 158 F. 2d 380 (2d Cir. 1946).
[Vol. 6
27
Baer: Discovery and Pre-Trial Examination in the Federal Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
DisCOVzY AND PRI-TRIAL EXAMINATION
Use of Depositions
Rule 27 (a) 4 provides that a deposition to perpetuate testimony
taken under Rule 27 or any deposition taken to perpetuate testimony
under state law or otherwise which would be admissible as evidence
in the state courts where taken can be used in an action later brought
involving the same subject matter as a deposition taken under Rule
26 d.
Rule 27 (b). Perpetuating testimony pending appeal.
This provides for the taking of depositions when the case is on
appeal, or before time to appeal has expired, to perpetuate testimony
for use in the event there should be further proceedings in the dis-
trict court.
The procedure is to make a motion in the district court on the
same notice and service as if the action were pending in the court.
that is not less than 5 days notice as provided in Rule 5 d.
The motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of the per-
sons to be examined, (2) what the substance of the testimony to
be elicited will be and (3) the reasons for perpetuating the testimony.
If the court finds the perpetuation is proper to avoid a failure or
delay of justice it may make an order allowing the taking of the deposi-
tions and such orders as would be appropriate under Rule 34 and Rule
35.
In closing this discussion of perpetuating testimony under Rule 27
I especially wish to emphasize that:
1. The procedure under Rule 27 is ancillary or auxiliary to the
contemplated action.
2. Like other ancillary proceedings it does not need independent
grounds for federal jurisdiction. But the action to be brought
in the future must have such grounds! That must appear in
the petition under Rule 27.
3. The venue requirement for the petition is not the same as for
an action . . . the only venue requirement is that the petition
be filed in the district of any one of the expected adverse party
or parties.
4. As was the old practice under the bill to perpetuate testimony,
permission to perpetuate testimony will be denied if the subject
matter of the expected action could be made the subject of an
immediate action in any court, state or federal. 40
40. Petition of Johanson Glove Co., 7 F.R.D. 156 (E.D. N.Y. 1945).
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RULE 36. ADMISSION OF FACTS AND GENUINENESS
OF DOCUMENTS.
Most states have provisions whereby a party may ask another to
admit the genuineness of a document. Others permit a party to ask
for an admission of facts set out in the request. Penalties for re-
fusal to admit vary from state to state.
Rule 36 establishes a very powerful tool for compelling admissions.
It applies not only to admission of genuineness of documents but
also to admissions of facts.
Procedure under Rule 36.
1. Any time after the commencement of an action a party may
serve on any other party a written request that the adverse
party admit
(1) the genuineness of any relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request, and/or
(2) the truth of any relevant matters of fact set out in the re-
quest.
Note: If a plaintiff wants to serve such request within 10
days from the start of the action he must get leave of
court.
2. You must serve copies of the documents with the request unless
they have already been furnished.
3. If the party on whom the request is served does nothing, he
will be deemed to have admitted each of the matters requested.
4. To avoid admission, the party served must, within the period
fixed by the request which cannot be less than 10 days after
service of the request (unless the court on notice and motion
allows a shorter or longer time) serve upon the party request-
ing admissions either:
(1) A sworn statement denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested, or setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those mat-
ters, or
(2) Written objections on the ground that some or all of the
requested admissions are privileged, or irrelevant, or that
the request otherwise improper in whole or in part. A
notice of the hearing of the objection at the earliest prac-
tical time must accompany the objection.
[Vol. 6
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If it appears that written objections apply to only a part of the
request, the part that is not objected to must be answered within the
required period. Good faith may require a party to deny a part, and
admit the truth of a part of a request.
The provision for written objections and motion attacking the
propriety of the demand was inserted in Rule 36 by amendment in
1946. Prior to that amendment a party was placed in a perilous
position if he deemed a request was improper. While there was some
conflict in the decisions, the courts generally held that a request for
admissions could not be attacked by motion. The party served had
to answer one way or another. Attorneys resorted to qualified ans-
wers and in some cases these were construed as admissions because
of their failure to specifically deny. Today, by virtue of the written
objection and motion procedure, that hazard is no longer present.
Effect of admission
Any admission made by a party pursuant to a request under Rule
36 is only for the purpose of the pending action and is not an admis-
sion for any other purpose nor can it be used against him in any
other proceedings.
RULE 37. CONSEQUENCES OR PENALTIES FOR
REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY.
Refusal to answer.
If a person whose deposition is being taken refuses to answer a
question the examiner may stop the examination or go on and have
the person examined, answer what he will, and then on reasonable
notice to all persons affected may apply to the district court in the
district where the deposition is being taken for an order compelling
an answer.
If the court grants the motion and finds there was no substantial
justification to refuse to answer, the court shall require the party
deponent, or party and attorney advising refusal, or any of them, to
pay the reasonable costs of the motion plus attorney's fees to the
examining party.
Conversely, if the motion is found to be without substantial justi-
fication, the court shall order the examining party or his attorney
advising the motion, or both, to pay the refusing party expenses
and attorney's fees on the motion.
1954]
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Failure to comply with court order.
(1) If a person refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer any
question after being directed to do so by the court in the dis-
trict in which the deposition is being taken he may be held
in contempt of that court.
(2) Other consequences:
If a person fails to obey an order that he answer oral questions
or interrogatories or fails to comply with an order for pro-
duction or inspection under Rule 34 or a physical or mental
examination under Rule 35 the court may make such orders
in regard to the refusal as are just and among others the
following:
(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions
were asked, or the character or description of the thing
or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical or
mental condition of the party, or any other designated
facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order;
(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to sup-
port or oppose designated claims or defences, or prohibit-
ing him from introducing in evidence designated docu-
ments or things or items of testimony, or evidence of
physical or mental condition;
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or stay-
ing proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing
the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render-
ing judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(iv) In lieu of or in addition to any of the above orders, an
order directing the arrest of any party or agent of a
party for disobeying any of such orders except an order
to submit to a physical or mental examination.
Payment of expenses.
If a request for admissions is made under Rule 36 and a sworn
denial is filed and then the requesting party proves the matter, he
may apply to the court for expenses and reasonable attorney's fees
in that connection. These will be allowed unless the court finds
[Vol. 6
31
Baer: Discovery and Pre-Trial Examination in the Federal Courts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
DISCOVERY AND PRZ-TRIAL EXAMINATION
there was good reason for the denial or that the admissions sought
were of no real importance. No expenses or attorney's fees may
be imposed against the United States under this rule.
Failure of a party to attend at taking of deposition or to serve answers.
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails
to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition after having
been served with proper notice, or if he fails to serve answers to in-
terrogatories under Rule 33 after proper service of such interroga-
tories, the court on motion and notice may, under Rule 37 (d),
(a) strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or
(b) dismiss the action or proceeding or any part of it, or
(c) enter a judgment by default against that party.
CONCLUSION
From what we have just considered it is readily apparent that the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules cannot be treated lightly.
The penalties for failure to comply are serious and most effective.
Refusal may prove disastrous to both litigant and counsel.
Rule 37 is the last of the Federal Rules on Discovery and marks
an appropriate place to bring this discussion to a dose. I have en-
joyed being with you and thank you all for the privilege of taking
part in this Institute.
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